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Between the Fall of the Gang of Four and the Rise of Best-Seller:
Modern China's Long Decade
Why write about the 1980s? Surely the past fifteen years 
during which China has  risen to  be the world's  second 
most  powerful  economic  power  is  a  much  more 
interesting period?  And in  the cultural  sphere so many 
more  spectacular  cultural  products  seem  to  have  been 
produced than before.
It is true that the 1990s witnessed the popularisation and 
economic exploitation of new literary and artistic trends, 
but these by and large had first emerged in the preceding 
decade. For example new (for China) forms such as 'avant-
garde' art and Wang Shuo's "hooligan literature", and the 
poets and novelists, such as Gao Xingjian who would later 
be awarded the Nobel Prize, were active in China in the 
immediate post Mao, post 1976, period before going into 
exile at the end of the 1980s. Nowadays, if the 1980s are 
mentioned at all, and they rarely are in China, it is as a 
moment  of  hesitant  transition,  or  a  period  of  missed 
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opportunities,  at  best  a  period  of  preparation  for  real 
wide-ranging  economic  reforms  of  a  hitherto  socialist 
economy.
But  the  1980s  constituted  not  merely  an  interval,  the 
middle card of a three card trick in which the first  and 
third  cards  were  respectively  the  Revolutionary  period, 
and the post-modernist capitalist era, but a major moment 
in China's recent cultural history, the last, so far, period of 
an intellectual and cultural  activity that  was defined by 
an  engagement  with,  or  contestation  of,  national,  state-
dominated political life.
After the death of Mao Zedong in 1976, the revolutionary 
period was declared over, and its achievements deemed 
nugatory, by the ruling group led by Deng Xiaoping that 
gained power in the late 1970s following the political coup 
called  “the  toppling  of  the  Gang  of  Four”.  But  the 
ideology and values that had dominated China's political 
and intellectual  elite  for  much of  the  twentieth  century 
continued  to  exercise  their  influence.  Even  those  who 
were now disillusioned with Communist  ideology were 
still  in thrall  of  its  logic,  its  mechanisms,  and its  ideals; 
embedded in the contestatory discourse and action of the 
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dissident intelligentsia was an idealistic, utopian notion of 
communism.  In other words, young dissident former Red 
Guards  were  driven  by  a  sense  of  injustice.  They  felt 
duped and even incensed, by the betrayal of the ideals of 
egalitarianism, liberation and total revolution that had so 
convinced them at the start of the Cultural Revolution.
Beyond communist ideology, but also central to it, was the 
inheritance  of  the  intellectual  class's  revolutionary 
discourse  that  had  its  beginnings  in  the  mid  to  late 
nineteenth  century.  This  patriotic,  anti-imperialist 
discourse  demanded  educated  youth  consecrate  their 
ambitions and their abilities to serving China.  This 'China' 
was  understood  as  a  post-traditional  state  defined  and 
coalesced  into  a  fictional  oneness  in  reaction  to  the 
aggression of numerous foreign powers.  
After the First World War, China emerged badly treated 
from the Versailles peace process, more like a vanquished 
power than the ally China had been to Britain, France, the 
USA and Japan. The reaction of China's intellectual class 
was  to  adopt  the  same logic  as  many other  Asian  and 
African countries seeking sovereignty, that  is  to say the 
logic of the attainment of independence and sovereignty 
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by  a  mandatory  and  inevitable  emulation  of  the 
modernized  nation-state  model,  to  which  there  was 
deemed to exist no alternative.  While denied to most of 
the world's non-white colonized peoples, the principle of 
national self-determination and the notion of the nation-
state as the epitome of modernity had been consolidated 
and reaffirmed by Wilson's doctrine and the new Europe 
founded upon it.  In China, the nexus between Versailles 
and  the  future  path  to  be  followed  was  dramatically 
illustrated by the 4th May 1919 student demonstrators who 
protested  against  the  outcome  of  the  treaty  talks  by 
marching across Tiananmen Square.  The protests evolved 
into  renewed  demands  for  Western-style  scientific  and 
political methods to be adopted.  As such what became 
known as the May 4th Movement merely reiterated more 
intensely  and  vociferously  demands  and  initiatives  in 
favour of cultural and scientific changes that were, in fact, 
already under way.  
But more than providing a new impulse to a process of 
modernization  (known  as  "Westernization"  during  the 
first half of the twentieth century) that was contradictorily 
supposed to liberate China from Western dominance, the 
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May  4th Movement,  echoing  the  fervour  of  the  1917 
Russian  Revolution,  provided  a  model  of  romantic 
revolutionary  fervour  for  urban  elite  youth  to  emulate. 
Indeed, the behaviour and ideological orientation of the 
ex-Red Guard, post Cultural Revolution intelligentsia can 
be traced back to that model.
But while Deng Xiaoping took advantage of these young 
dissenters  of  the  1978-79  Democracy Wall  to  assure  his 
own  position  in  the  new  hierarchy,  he  simultaneously 
courted the original May Fourth generation (to which he 
himself  belonged)  and  reinstalled  the  literary  and 
intellectual personalities that had peopled the Communist 
literary scene since the 1930s.
Thus, in the early 1980s the literary and cultural field was 
still  dominated  by  authors  and  literary  establishment 
bureaucrats  who had first  risen to  prominence in 1930s 
Shanghai.  It  was  this  old  guard  that  Deng  Xiaoping 
promoted  and  protected.  Needless  to  say,  the  vast 
majority were radically out-of-step with the realities of the 
changed times and the new literary and cultural strategies 
that the generation of ex-Red Guards were thirsting for.
The  lives  and  works  of  this  older  generation  occupied 
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almost  entirely  the  official  literary-cultural  organs  and 
structures of the late 1970s and early 1980s.  It was as if 
being able to step back to before the Cultural Revolution 
would  suffice  to  fill  the  cultural  void  left  by  the 
eradication of Cultural Revolution policies. But the world 
and  China's  urban  elite  had  moved  on  and  craved 
something  more  and  something  different.  Much  of  the 
antagonism in the cultural  sphere throughout the 1980s 
resulted from, first,  this inability of the establishment to 
grasp that the old Marxist-Leninist literary formulae were 
inappropriate  to  China’s  and  the  world’s  changed 
circumstances,  and,  secondly,  the  inability  of  the 
authorities to produce new cultural content to match the 
new  consumer-oriented  society  that  Deng’s  policies 
heralded  and  promoted.   Throughout  the  1980s,  for 
instance,  the  availability  of  television  sets  in  China 
increased dramatically, but there was a lack of content to 
accompany this economic and technological sea-change in 
urban China’s culture and consumption habits.1  
In the domain of  elite  culture,  it  was the underground, 
1 In 1978 less than 1%of China's urban population possessed a television set, 
ten years later the figure stood at nearly 40%, according to Joshua Aleksandr 
Harman in "Relative Deprivation and Worker Unrest in Mainland China" 
(http://mcel.pacificu.edu/aspac/papers/scholars/harman/ Harman.htm, 
consulted 15 February 2007).
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non-official poets who were avidly read in the universities 
and by the young intellectual class in general, and not the 
newly  re-installed  and  newly  productive  old  men  of 
letters  such  as  poets  Ai  Qing  and  Bian  Zhilin  whose 
cultural and political vision had been honed by decades of 
surviving  the  twists  and  turns  of  cultural  and  political 
campaigns.
It is thus difficult to understand fully the cultural politics 
of  the 1980s without  alluding to earlier  politico-cultural 
debates.  During the 1980s not only would controversies of 
the People's  Republic  of  China prior  to  1976 re-emerge, 
but also resonances of arguments and feuds dating back to 
the 1930s.
In 1949, at the end of the Civil War between Chiang Kai-
shek's Nationalists and the Communists, China had three 
locii  of  power.  Nanjing  (Nanking)  that  had  been  the 
administrative  capital  of  the  Republic  of  China  (1911-
1949),  Yan'an  the  terminus  of  the  Long  March  and 
revolutionary  base  of  the  CCP  from  which  its  military 
offensives  were  launched  and  where  Mao's  dominance 
and  his  ideological  leadership  had  triumphed,  and 
spectacular  Shanghai:  cultural,  intellectual  and 
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commercial metropolis of Republican China.
After  the  Civil  War  all  power  shifted  to  the  much less 
glamorous  but  symbolically  important  northern  capital, 
Beijing. Nanjing now returned to its position as a former 
imperial capital.  Yan'an in the popular imaginary would 
become a mythic decentred centre of the Revolution.  But 
the political line that had been elaborated there by Mao 
and  his  supporters  would  continue  to  constitute  the 
dominant  ideology  of  New  China's  socio-cultural 
topology.
Yan'an had provided not only a military haven for China's 
communists during the 1930s and 1940s, but also a base 
for the production of the cultural forms necessary to win 
over  China's  people.  Hundreds  of  city-bred  cultural 
producers  flocked  to  the  revolutionary  base,  especially 
after the Japanese occupation of Shanghai in 1937. But the 
Communist Party had a very specific notion of culture as 
an instrument to attain its ends. 
In  1942  to  mark Women’s  Day,  the  early  revolutionary 
feminist  writer  Ding  Ling  wrote  an  editorial  in  the 
Communist  Party  organ’s  literary  supplement  to  draw 
attention to the lot of women in areas under Communist 
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control and Ai Qing wrote an article entitled “Understand 
Authors,  Respect  Authors”.  Subsequently,  Mao 
summoned  all  “literary  workers”  to  a  conference  that 
would set down the rules to be observed by those engaged 
in literary production;  a rigid policy that  would remain 
effective for the following four decades.  It was in what 
became known as the "Yan'an Talks on Literature and Art" 
that  Mao  had  made  clear  the  strict  and  dogmatic 
guidelines  for  literary  and  cultural  production.  In  a 
passage doubtlessly aimed at Ding Ling, Ai Qing and their 
comrades Mao warned:
Intellectuals of petty-bourgeois origin always stubbornly 
try  in  all  sorts  of  ways,  including  literary  and artistic 
ways, to project themselves and spread their views, and 
they want the Party and the world to be remoulded in 
their own image. In the circumstances it is our duty to 
jolt these "comrades" and tell them sharply, "That won't 
work! The proletariat cannot accommodate itself to you; 
to  yield  to  you  would  actually  be  to  yield  to  the  big 
landlord class and the big bourgeoisie and to run the risk 
of undermining our Party and our country."2
 
Yan'an,  the  new  cultural  centre  of  revolutionary  China 
was far removed from the freer and more bohemian leftist 
milieu of  1920s and 1930s Shanghai  that  had nourished 
modern China's intelligentsia.  Shanghai had constituted a 
centre  of  exploration  and  of  innovation  replete  with 
burgeoning  cinema  industry,  bookshops  and  literary 
2 Mao Tse-tung, Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art, Peking : 
Foreign Languages Press, 1967, p. 38. 
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presses that transmitted Western ideas and culture, thus 
allowing new intellectual and literary trends to develop.
When in  the mid-1980s  the  so-called “cultural  fever”,  a 
new found passion for Western culture and theory, was at 
its height in China, and Western literature and ideas were 
being heatedly discussed in elite intellectual circles, what 
tended to  be  forgotten,  or  more  probably  was not  ever 
known,  was  that  this  renaissance  of  interest  for  the 
foreign, echoed a process that had already taken place in 
Shanghai in the 1920s and 1930s.  Freud, for instance was 
“discovered”  in  1980s  Beijing,  but  in  fact  was  merely 
rediscovered  since  the  1930s  modernist  writer  and 
translator Shi Zhecun had already made extensive use of 
Freud’s  theories  in  the  writing  of  his  short  stories  that 
attempted to account for the alienation of the individual in 
the modern urban world that was Shanghai.  In short, as 
was the case in the debate on menglong or obscure poetry 
in the 1980s, the politico-literary arguments over freedom 
of  expression,  and the  purpose  of  creative  writing,  had 
already  been  rehearsed  fifty  years  previously.   Indeed, 
what would give greater substance to the impression of 
repetition was the participation in the 1980s debate of a 
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number of authors such as Ai Qing and Bian Zhilin, who 
had themselves already been active in the 1930s.  In the 
debate  over  the  need for  literature  to  be  transparent,  a 
position maintained by the official establishment writers 
and academics, for instance, while the immediate object of 
discussion  was menglongshi,  this  was  in  part  displaced 
onto  a  discussion  of  1930s  modernism,  and  specifically 
onto  the  poetry  of  the  francophile  Shanghai  modernist 
poet Dai Wangshu (1905-50).
But behind the argument over the capacity of a non-realist 
mode to express adequately the realities of everyday life, 
there  was  a  further  objective:  to  oppose  the  political 
position of the Shanghai modernists who while largely on 
the  left  and  supportive  of  radical  change  in  China, 
obstinately  maintained  that  writers  should  be  left  their 
autonomy.   This  was  a  position  that  attracted  much 
opprobrium  from  the  mainstream  1930s  Communist 
writers and the major fellow-traveller Lu Xun, historically 
the best known literary figure of the twentieth century. 
The recuperated 1930s debate over the relative merits of 
realism and modernism, intertwined with the question of 
writerly freedom, was thus used during the early 1980s as 
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a  vehicle  to  criticize  contemporary  literary  tendencies. 
What had been politically incorrect in the 1930s remained 
so in the 1980s.  For instance, Ye Deyu in a fairly liberal 
Communist  literary  journal  entitled  Modern  Chinese  
Literary Research, published in March 1981, and therefore 
written  probably  in  1980,  the  author  reproduces  Mao 
Zedong’s  1926  analysis  of  China’s  middle  class  as  an 
authority  to  condemn  the  1930s  writer,  Du  Heng’s 
pretensions to writerly independence.3 The citation from 
Mao's ‘Analysis of China’s Social Classes’ concludes that 
the  Chinese  bourgeoisie’s  aspiration  to  « independent » 
revolutionary thought, was purely and simply an illusion. 
This  discussion is  intended to be read in the context  of 
early  1980s,  for  at  the  same  moment  the  debate  over 
contemporary poetry was much in the literary and even 
extra-literary official press. 
The  year  1979  had  seen  numerous  non-official  poems 
published,  largely  in  the  underground  magazine 
Jintian/Today.  Meanwhile many of the older generation of 
official  poets  had  begun  to  re-publish  in  the  official 
national poetry magazine Shikan.
The January issue of 1980 foregrounded a poem by 1930s 
3 1981, pp 25-26.
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poet,  Xu Chi,  who would later  publish  a  book entitled 
Modernization  and  Modernity.4  The  poem  entitled  “The 
Eighties”  begins  with  an  admonition  (addressed  to  the 
authorities?)
Don’t try and use locks to lock up minds,
To do so would be a fruitless effort, 
And continues with an exhortation (to the reader?)
The eighties have already shaken hands with you,
Modernization wants to embrace you
What seems at first an appeal for openness is in fact an 
appeal for China’s population to embrace not modernity 
as  such  but  the  Party’s  official  credo  of  targeted 
modernizations:  "The  four  modernizations  are 
unstoppable."
It will be recalled that the four modernizations (of China's 
industrial,  scientific,  agricultural  and  military 
infrastructures) constituted the major policy plank of the 
CCP reform faction.  But it was Wei Jingsheng who, the 
year before Xu Chi's poem was published,  had called for a 
fifth political modernization: democratization.  But in Xu 
Chi's  poem,  there  is  no  question  of  defining 
modernization as anything other than the official road to 
4 First published as an article in Wenyibao, II (1982).
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material and infrastructural development.
The rehabilitated official  poets were amply fulfilling the 
contract that Deng had concluded with them in 1979. But 
the official national poetry journal could not continue to 
pretend that the non-official poetry that was everywhere 
posted up on walls, distributed in samizdat broadsheets, 
and recited in  impromptu poetry  ‘salons’  did not  exist. 
The  fact  that  the  renaissance  of  poetic  interest  and 
creativity  was  happening  unsupervised  and  unbridled 
was of concern not simply to the political authorities but 
also to those charged with reviving a genre that had not 
prospered since the 1940s.
In the September 1980 issue of  Poetry Journal, Li Yuanluo 
addresses  the  question  of  the  new  « hazy  and  hard  to 
understand » poetry.5  Li goes on to remind readers that 
the  modern  Chinese  poetry  movement  had  already 
embraced such poetry in the 1920s and 1930s, and cites a 
poem by Li Jinfa whose poetry at the time was deemed 
unreadable. While Li Yuanluo believed that poetry need 
not necessarily by easy to understand, it nevertheless had 
to be socially useful and “advance the great  cause of our 
5 Shikan 1980, n°.9, pp. 47-48.
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four modernizations”.6 He concludes: 
As for  people  who say  those  incomprehensible  poems 
mark  the  beginning  of  “poetry’s  modernization”,  I 
simply  believe  that  such  a  “beginning”  is  in  fact  its 
“end”.7
This  was  nevertheless  immediately  followed  by  the 
announcement that out of 2000 odd poems considered for 
publication; those of 17 young poets had been retained for 
publication in the following month's, October’s, edition of 
Poetry  Journal.   The  list  includes  the  names  of  several 
notoriously “misty poets”: Jiang He, Gu Cheng, and Shu 
Ting.   All  the  poets  on  the  list  had  attended  a  poetry 
workshop with older official  poets  Ai Qing,  Zang Kejia 
and Tian Jian in July and August 1980.
Shu  Ting’s  and  Jiang  He’s  contributions  were 
unexceptional,  but among Gu Cheng’s poems was what 
was to become an emblematic “misty” poem, “Distant and 
Close”
You,
Now you look at me
Now you look at the clouds.
I think
When you look at me you are very distant
When you look at the clouds you are very close.
The  “menglong”  polemic  continued  in  the  next  issue, 
6 Shikan 1980, n°.9, p. 48.
7 Shikan 1980, n°.9, p. 48.
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N°11, and flowed on into 1981.8  In the March issue of the 
journal another old-time poet, Yuan Kejia wrote:
Poems cannot be evaluated as good or bad unless they 
are  understandable  in  the  first  place…   The 
incomprehensibility  of  some  poems  results  from  the 
mechanical imitation of Western poetry.
An astonishing statement from one of the pioneers of the 
anti-traditional iconoclastic New Poetry Movement of the 
1920s  and  1930s  that  was  almost  entirely  founded  on 
Western models of versification and form.
The debate on 'misty poetry' or ‘obscure poetry’ was no 
mere esoteric, academic quarrel, it was indeed part of an 
ideological  struggle  at  the  highest  levels.  The  word  in 
China, in revolutionary China, had always been a political 
vehicle.  It was inconceivable that the authorities should 
ignore the literary and cultural sphere, on the contrary it 
was one of their main concerns and constituted a battle-
ground  between  conservatives  and  reformers.  This 
explains  the  apparent  contradictory  and  seemingly 
haphazard  discourse  and  actions  of  the  reform  faction. 
While  the  reformers  wished  to  unleash  the  country 
intellectual and cultural capital, they could not be seen to 
be slack in allowing dissident literary and cultural voices 
to go unchecked. Moreover, it was not in the interests of 
8 Shikan 1980, n°11, pp. 50-53.
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the Party machine as a whole to allow intellectuals to have 
unrestrained freedom of expression.  
Apart  from  a  number  of  poems  from  the  1970s  that 
alluded relatively clearly to a general disillusionment with 
Maoist  ideology,  the politicalness of  "misty poetry"  was 
generally to be found in its very refusal to be political in a 
habitually ideological way. It did not overtly challenge the 
regnant  authority  on  its  own  ground,  but  rather 
established a new or alternative terrain beyond or outside 
traditional  political  controversy.  It  was  a  poetry  that 
attempted to give back autonomy to the writer and reader, 
agency  to  the  imagination,  and  power  to  language. 
Witness this poem by Duo Duo written at the height of the 
"misty poetry" controversy:
Language is made in the kitchen
If language is made in the kitchen
The heart is the bedroom. They say
If the heart is the bedroom
Wishful thinking is its master
From the wishful thinking expressed in the bird's eyes
The boy who fiddles with the trumpet mute
Agrees: commotion 
Is just like meter 
A brain incapable of dream
Is just a stretch of time's wasteland
The boy who fiddles with the mute recognizes
But does not understand
Contracepted seed
Just cannot produce images
17
Each seed is a reason…
Wanting to speak
A reason, just like an address
Does not speak. The wild man smoking a cigarette
Does not speak just presses the walnut
Into the table top. They speak
Saying all discussion
Must cease -- when
Horses all around are so silent
When they, are inspecting people's eyes
1983
Most  of  the  so-called  Misty  Poets,  including  Bei  Dao, 
Mang Ke,  Gu  Cheng,  and  Duo  Duo,  had  been  writing 
'unofficial' poetry inspired by a modernist aesthetic and a 
revulsion for Mao-idolatric lyric products, since the early 
1970s.
Mang  Ke,  for  instance,  in  a  1973  poem  that  could  be 
interpreted as dissenting from the political line describing 
the sun as having 'sunk' is at the very least departing from 
the officially sanctioned and required lyric praise for Mao, 
the Party and the Motherland.  This poem by Duo Duo 
dated  1973  and  thus  composed  during  the  Cultural 
Revolution,  would  only  be  officially  published  in  the 
1980s:
Night
On a night full of symbols
The moon is like an invalid's pallid face
Like a mistaken shifted time
18
And death, like a doctor standing before the bed:
Some merciless emotions
Some internally chilling changes
Moonlight in the void before the room softly coughs 
Moonlight hinting clearly at exile…
1973 
The  situation  was  perhaps  more  difficult  for  older 
establishment  writers  such  as  novelist  and  screenwriter 
Bai Hua, and reportage writer Liu Binyan than it was for 
the non-official  (and therefore theoretically non-existent) 
young poets.
In January 1980, barely three months after Deng Xiaoping 
had  addressed  the  Writers'  Congress,  ostensibly 
encouraging free literary creation, his protégé, the liberal 
Hu Yaobang warned a gathering of playwrights that they 
should take into account the social impact of their literary 
production. Throughout  1980  the  atmosphere  became 
even more restrictive.  
In April 1980, the Standing Committee of the 14th Session 
of the 5th National People's Congress (China's parliament), 
abrogated Article 45 of the Constitution which accorded 
the right to post up dazibao, or big character poster. There 
would be no more "democracy walls".
Also during the year, most of the surviving unofficial or 
'underground' magazines were suppressed, although the 
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most  well-known  underground literary  magazine  Today 
struggled on a little longer.  The tone hardened yet again 
in  1981  with  democracy  activists  being  described  as 
“dissidents” or even as supporters of the Gang of Four. In 
April the last of the democracy magazines,  Zeren, ceased 
publication, after joint CCP Central Committee and State 
Council  directives  were  issued  on  20th  February  1981 
calling  for  the  closure  of  « illegal »  magazines  and 
organizations. A number of editors and activists were then 
arrested  and  incarcerated.  Bei  Dao  and  Chen  Maiping, 
editors of Today, escaped this fate since theirs was a more 
‘misty’ less directly political publication. The question of 
‘underground’  and  non-official  buguanfang literary  and 
political activity had therefore been settled. The message 
was  a  short  and  straightforward  one.  Such  ‘fringe’ 
activities  would  be  ill-received.  The  authorities  then 
turned their attention to the official cultural sphere.
In late  April  1981 just  within the South Gate of  Peking 
University there appeared a blackboard notice written up 
in  brightly  coloured chalks;  this  was  a  frequently used, 
cheap although temporary medium, with which to attract 
people’s attention to political and cultural events. The text 
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defended the playwright Bai Hua who had been criticized 
in the authoritative PLA publication Liberation Army Daily 
on 20th April 1981.  
The Bai Hua controversy came at an unwelcome moment 
for the reformists who were pushing forward with their 
consolidation  of  power.  The  campaign  against  Bai  Hua 
was reminiscent of out-dated revolutionary methods and 
the  international  reaction  embarrassed  that  part  of  the 
Chinese leadership wishing to enhance China’s image. 
Bai Hua  was an "official" writer. Born in 1930, he was a 
member of the intermediate category of writers between 
the ‘old guard’  of  the May 4th generation now in their 
seventies  and  the  former  Red  Guards  now  in  their 
twenties. A member of the Communist Party from 1946, 
he entered the People's Liberation Army in 1947 and was 
assigned  to  its  propaganda  unit.  He  started  writing  in 
1951 while remaining in the army. In 1957 he was a victim 
of  the  anti-rightist  campaign  and  denounced  as  a 
“bourgeois rightist”, excluded from the Party, discharged 
from  the  army,  and  condemned  to  ‘reform  through 
labour’. He started writing film scripts on his release in 
1961 and was reintegrated by the PLA into its Arts and 
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Literature  Department.  At  the  start  of  the  Cultural 
Revolution  in  1966,  he  was  labelled  a  member  of  the 
counter-revolutionary  “black  gang”,  separated  from  his 
wife until 1973, and denied the right to write until 1976; 
being denied the privilege of writing was meant literally, 
it did not simply signify being barred from publishing.  
In  1977,  he  once  again  turned  to  writing,  and  in  1979 
published his  Bitter Love in the official literary magazine 
October (N°3, 1979).  In 1980 Bai Hua produced the film 
script version of  Bitter Love  which went by the title  Sun 
and  Man and  the  Changchun  film  studio  produced  the 
film. It would however never be publicly screened.
The scenario of Bitter Love recounts the story of a Western-
style  painter,  Ling  Chenguang  who  leaves  China  and 
achieves a degree of success abroad. He returns, as many 
thousands of  young intellectuals  did in  response to  the 
government’s  appeal,  after  the  founding  of  the  PRC  in 
1949,  to  help  build  New  China.  Rapidly  branded  a 
“rightist” and persecuted during the Cultural Revolution, 
he resists the temptation to leave China once more, as his 
daughter, in a line of dialogue that would draw intense 
criticism,  foregrounds  the  unreciprocated  nature  of  his 
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fidelity to  his  country:  “You love your motherland,  but 
does  your  motherland  love  you?”  Almost  deranged  he 
flees to the wintry countryside where before collapsing in 
the snow he sees traced in the sky by a flock of storks the 
Chinese character  ren, ‘person’ or ‘human’.  His corpse is 
then represented in the form of a  question mark in the 
snow. The significance of the question mark is clear: the 
interrogation  of  an  intellectual’s  sacrifice  for  a  society, 
here defined as the country, the motherland. The sense of 
the Chinese character  ren is less transparent perhaps, but 
given  that  the  revolutionary  ideology  denounced  the 
privileging of the individual as bourgeois humanism and 
favoured a class vision of society, this would doubtless be 
read as  inferring that  hope  lay  in  a  valorization  of  the 
individual human being, a humanist vision of society.
Not  only  was  the  film  denounced  as  unpatriotic  and 
verging  on  the  unacceptably  ‘bourgeois  humanist’,  but 
there were also scenes that seem to criticize the Mao cult. 
In other words, there was sufficient in the film to make it 
detestable  to  the  Party  higher  echelons’  conservative 
elements who saw the film as a prime object for critique. 
In other words, it could be used as an excuse to launch a 
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campaign which indirectly would target the liberal faction 
of  the Party  associated with Hu Yaobang.  Conservative 
elements persuaded Deng Xiaoping that the film was not 
only unpatriotic but that it also represented an anti-Deng 
tendency.  The  affair  dragged  on  for  most  of  1981.  A 
compromise solution was found: Bai Hua was encouraged 
to sign a self-criticism that had been prepared for him and 
this was then published in the national press.9
In 1983, the campaign against independent expression was 
launched,  it  was  called  the  “campaign  against  spiritual 
pollution”,  in  other  words  the  adoption  of  Western 
sociocultural habits and practices.  What was targeted by 
this  campaign  included  everyday  practices  such  as  the 
wearing  of  lipstick  and  Western  hairstyles.   But  the 
principle objective of the conservative cultural authorities 
was  the  writerly  class  and  above  all,  and  once  again, 
literary modernism.
The year 1985 has been called the year of the “book series 
craze” (the Chinese publishing industry has always been 
heavily  invested  in  the  production  of  series  of  books 
9 For Bai Hua’s own full account of the ‘Bitter Love’ controversy see his 
interview with Cheng Yingxiang in Cheng Yingxiang, Dégel de l’intelligence en  
Chine 1978-1989, Paris, Gallimard, 2004.
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rather  than  free-standing  monographs).10  The  year  has 
also been denoted as  the  year when the Cultural  Fever 
took off. However, my own experience and frequentation 
of figures in the cultural sphere did not leave me with any 
impression  of  frenzied  activity,  or  indeed  of  an 
atmosphere particularly conducive to cultural creativity.
While  there  were  still  poetry  salons,  and  heated 
discussions in my apartment or those of poet-friends or 
thinkers such as Zhou Duo (who would be one of the last 
protestors at Tiananmen in June 1989), as 1985 drew to a 
close the atmosphere was nevertheless morose.  There had 
also  been  acts  of  censorship  reminiscent  of  the  Anti-
Spiritual Pollution campaign that was now supposed to be 
a closed affair.  Once again, the habitual linear history of 
campaigns  followed  by  long  moments  of  freedom  of 
activity  is  too  neat  and  simple;  see  for  instance  the 
fangshou or  'relax  and  restraint'  political  science  model 
which sees political policy as a series of alternate liberal 
and  conservative  moments.   The  reality  is  much  more 
complex  and  resists  the  simple  geometry  of  a  two-
dimensional model. 
10 See Chen Fong-Ching and Jin Guantao, From Youthful Manuscripts to River  
Elegy: The Chinese Popular Cultural Movement and Political Transformation, 1979-
1989, Hong Kong, Chinese University Press , 1997, p.124.
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However,  in  the  world  of  academe  and  intellectually 
serious publishing, it is a fact that a thirst for knowledge, 
especially for Western twentieth-century knowledge, was 
being  assuaged  by  new  collections  of  books  that  were 
produced by intellectuals close to the reform faction and 
organisms that were part of or close to the CASS.
What  has  generally  been  called  'cultural  fever'  was  no 
mass phenomenon, but more like a localized and intense 
exchange of ideas amongst an elite intellectual sphere. 
But the cultural world, the film-makers, the writers and 
poets, were less interested in theoretical writing and direct 
intervention in the political debate than they were in the 
cultural products of the Western modern canon, films and 
translations  of  fiction  and  poetry.  The  year  1986  was 
known as a high point in the production and reception of 
the new poetry.
However scientists, academics, and writers did share the 
pre-occupation  and  the  sense  of  duty  to  participate  in 
political debate. When poets intervened in things political, 
it  was  not  like their  forbears through their  writing,  but 
through their celebrity. They literally put their reputations 
on the line by initiating and signing up to petitions and 
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open letters. For example, in early 1989 the poet Bei Dao 
launched the "33 name petition" of writers and artists to 
demand  the  release  of  dissident  Wei  Jingsheng 
incarcerated since the so-called Peking Spring of 1979. But 
the tenth anniversary of Wei's imprisonment was juts one 
of  the  many  anniversaries  that  could  be  exploited 
politically and in spectacular fashion. It was also the 200th 
anniversary of the French Revolution, the 70th anniversary 
of the 1919 May 4th Movement, and 1989 also marked the 
40th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. 
The  untimely  death  of  deposed  Prime  Minister  Hu 
Yaobang incited mass-mourning, students protested and 
occupied Tiananmen Square.  The confrontation between 
students  and government  wih  intellectuals  and  cultural 
producers  desperately  trying  to  mediate  ended  as  we 
know in the bloody night of 3rd-4th June 1989, which surely 
imposes itself as the inevitable terminus of the long post-
Mao decade. 
Yet,  from  political  economic  perspectives  the  Dengist 
consumerist legacy which pervades China today, cannot 
be said to have commenced before 1993 when an ailing 
Deng found the strength to visit southern China and re-
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launch his  economic reform programme.   Between 1989 
and 1992 China, and especially Beijing, was gripped by an 
almost  palpable  moroseness.   This  constituted a  sort  of 
inter-regnum before the great consumerist euphoria made 
possible not just by material incentives but by a sense of 
resignation  and  of  powerlessness.  The  only  means  of 
expression  left  to  ordinary  people,  in  other  words  the 
politically powerless, in the face of a system now clearly 
based  on  a  willingness  to  employ  military  strength  to 
maintain  itself,  was  wealth  accumulation,  and 
consumption.  With political participation now closed off 
to  elite  intellectuals  and  masses  alike,  the  line  of  least 
resistance was to acquiesce in the party-induced but later 
on  self-generative  collective  amnesia  concerning  the 
events of 1989, and eventually with regard to the whole 
1970s-1980s pre-consumerist,  politicized period.  Official 
ideology once again thus succeeded in instituting itself as 
dominant collective imaginary.  
Politicization,  even  after  the  deception  of  the  Cultural 
Revolution and in part because of that deception, was a 
characteristic of the 1980s.  It was a decade marked also by 
intellectual, cultural and political negotiation between the 
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Party  on  the  one  hand  and  on  the  other  civil  forces 
represented by students, and public intellectuals such as 
party dissident journalists.  
It was also a period dominated by an ideology that was 
promoted by reformers within the party, and espoused by 
many  intellectuals,  and  feared  by  hard-liners.   That 
ideology was the credo fed in large part by the old Cold 
War  illusion  that  economic  reforms,  leading  to  the 
installation of capitalism would inevitably and naturally 
lead  to  a  process  of  political  reforms  and 
'democratization'.   History  since  1989  in  China  and 
elsewhere has proven otherwise. 11
It is as if  the warning signs that announced the ground 
rules that had been made clear in 1979 with the arrest and 
imprisonment of dissidents and the introduction of strict 
censorship  were  ignored.   In  any  case,  throughout  the 
1980s and, frequently encouraged by elements within the 
official  structures,  intellectuals  and  cultural  producers 
pushed against, tested and transgressed the limits that had 
been imposed in 1979. Such political participation has not 
been evident since. 
11 The participation in the global capitalist economy of former state-
controlled socio-economies has not significantly democratized them, while 
democracy in those countries that 'won' the Cold War has suffered serious 
reverses.
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The major shift in the cultural sphere that took place in the 
1990s  was  the  liberalization  of  the  economics  of  the 
literature and culture industries.  What mattered now was 
not gaining membership in the writers' union that hitherto 
had  guaranteed  job  security,  a  steady  income  and  the 
freedom to travel abroad, but rather the ability to produce 
best-sellers.  But while the state w as willing to cede 
to the economic realities of the publishing industry, it was 
not,  and  is  still  not,  prepared  to  relinquish  its  role  as 
censor.  
The  "deal"  has  been  observed  by  writers,  artists  and 
academics. While they are now free to get rich, in post-
1989  China,  they  would  be  ill-advised  to  attempt  to 
intervene in critical debate. 
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